Exhibit B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ANTANINA SERAKOVA,

Plaintiff,

v.

Case No. 1:21-cv-02066 (TNM)

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER

On September 24, 2021, the Court held a hearing on Serakova's Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. That Motion asks the Court to reserve past September 30, 2021, an unused Fiscal Year 2021 diversity visa. *See* ECF No. 5. For the reasons stated on the record, the Court denies Serakova's Motion.

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby

ORDERED that Plaintiff's [5] Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 24, 2021

This is a final, appealable Order.

2021.09.24 16:24:26 -04'00'

TREVOR N. McFADDEN United States District Judge

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ANTANINA SEROKOVA,

Plaintiff,

CV Action No. 1:21-2066

VS.

Washington, DC SEPTEMBER 24, 2021

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.,

2:30 p.m.

Defendant.

TRANSCRIPT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
BEFORE THE HONORABLE TREVOR N. McFADDEN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

APPEARANCES:

For the Plaintiff: JULIA GREENBERG

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Washington, DC 20001

202-354-3196

PROCEEDINGS

COURTROOM DEPUTY: Your Honor, this is Civil 1 2 Action 21-2066, Antanina Serakova versus Joseph R. Biden, 3 Jr. Counsel, please come forward to identify yourself 4 5 for the record, starting with the plaintiff. 6 MS. GREENBERG: Julia Greenberg for the 7 petitioner, Antanina Serakova. THE COURT: Good afternoon. 8 9 MR. WEILAND: William Weiland for the federal 10 defendants, Your Honor. 11 THE COURT: We are here for motion for a TRO and 12 preliminary injunction. I would expect to rule on them 13 together. 14 I'll hear from you, Ms. Greenberg. 15 MS. GREENBERG: Thank you, Your Honor. 16 THE COURT: Approach the podium, ma'am. 17 MS. GREENBERG: In deciding plaintiff's motion, 18 this court should consider four factors: Movant's 19 likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm to the 20 movant, whether the injunction would injure others and 21 whether the plaintiff interest is advanced by this 22 injunction. 23 I will start first with I think is the most 24 contentious factor, is the movant likelihood to success on 25 the merits.

Petitioner is a foreign national. She is a citizen of Belarus, who last year won 2021 diversity visa lottery. Despite the win and despite petitioner's compliance with all rules and regulations prescribed for DV winners, petitioner submitted her DV visa application on the first day of the fiscal year, which was September 30th, 2020.

Despite that, the defendant arbitrarily refused to enforce U.S. laws as the Congress has written it; to wit, in 1990 the Congress amended INA to provide 55,000 diversity immigrant visas each year to people in from countries with low immigration level.

Why did the Congress did it? Because it wanted to diversify U.S. immigration system as opposed to have an influx of immigrants from only particular countries.

THE COURT: Ma'am, the government suggests that that's a ceiling, not a floor. Do you disagree with that?

MS. GREENBERG: I don't disagree with that.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. GREENBERG: Requirements of the DV visa application is -- DV visa applicant had to be educated, healthy, lack of criminal record and not pose a threat to national security.

DV selectees can apply for immigrant visa only during the fiscal year. And pursuant to INA, defendants

shall adjudicate the application during the fiscal year.

They don't have the discretionary power whether to

adjudicate these applications or not. Defendants in this

case failed to do so.

During the first half of the fiscal year, defendant failed to process any DV visa applications. And according to the declaration of Ms. Miles, the Kentucy Counsular Center did work remotely. Maybe due to pandemic there were not sufficient people on site, but that should not have prevented the Kentucky service center from processing DV visa applications.

THE COURT: Don't you think it explains why things slowed down? I think, certainly, the court system has slowed down over the last year and a half. I think FOIA cases, the federal agencies have definitely slowed down, especially at the beginning when they were changing to remote working.

MS. GREENBERG: Yes, Your Honor. But the court did not stop working. I understand that we do not expect all 55,000 visa cases to be processed and adjudicated, but we certainly should not expect the Kentucky Consular Center just to completely stopping adjudicating of DV visa applications.

THE COURT: But is that what they did?

MS. GREENBERG: According to Ms. Miles'

declaration, and this is my understanding as to what has happened.

THE COURT: That they just have not done any?

MS. GREENBERG: Yes.

THE COURT: Continuing to today or is that since the beginning of the year?

MS. GREENBERG: Well, according to the declaration of Ms. Miles, they resumed in June of this year processing of DV visa application for 2021. I believe they did stop processing some of the DV visa application for 2020. But when it comes to DV visa application for 2021, they only started in June of this year.

May I proceed, Your Honor?

THE COURT: You may.

MS. GREENBERG: Thank you.

During the first half of the fiscal year, defendant failed to process any DV visa applications. The proclamation 114, on which they relied, in suspending processing of visa application, did not mandate the defendant to stop working. It only banned the entry of immigrants to the United States, not processing their visa application.

And I think that's primarily what we are relying on, Your Honor. So we state that defendants erroneously thought that because of the proclamation of former president

Trump, that people could not enter the country on immigrant visa, they were empowered or entitled to stop processing those visa applications.

Because the proclamation 114 had an expiration date, I don't see how it was reasonable. Because had they processed DV visa applications when the proclamation expired in March or when it was ruled to be in violation of the laws a month earlier, then people would have been able to enter the country on the visas that were issued, or at least had an opportunity to have their cases scheduled at the U.S. embassies abroad.

THE COURT: So you are saying -- your understanding is that the, I guess, State Department stopped issuing visas for a time, because of that proclamation, but they resumed in March. Right?

MS. GREENBERG: Well, in March the following happened, they created this prioritization scheme where they resumed processing, but they put DV visa applicants in the lowest tier, as a non-priority, despite the fact that this is the only visa category that had expiration date.

In other words, I understand that there were huge backlog on family visa categories, employment, but those visas did not have expiration date. The DV visa application did have an expiration date, and pretty soon it would have been expired.

And despite that, the Department of State decided to put them, basically, on the low priority. And because of that, it was not processing them. I think they started processing in April of 2021, and then -- excuse me, Your Honor. I am going to open Ms. Miles' declaration, because I think it talks about that. Yes, Your Honor.

So in April 2021 it started scheduling some of the low-priority DV visa applications. It is unclear to me, and maybe the defendants will clarify whether it was 2020 DV visa applicants reserved or whether that was 2021 DV applicants.

According to Ms. Miles' declaration, it wasn't until June of this year that they started processing DV-2021 visa applications. And in four months' period, considering that they are still in low priority, they were able to process 10,439 DV-2021 visa applications.

So had they started earlier and not violated the laws, the INA, I think my client certainly -- well, other people similarly situated and my client certainly would have had a chance to have their DV visa application processed and scheduled for an interview.

THE COURT: So, I mean, as I understand the issue though, you have all of these different people seeking visas in different categories. The government is strapped for manpower because of COVID-19. So they're dealing with this

flood of visas, visa applications. They have fewer workers to handle them. They have this backlog now from 2020.

I mean, I just feel very uncomfortable in, kind of, second guessing their prioritization. We are getting all of these cases in our court. You probably are bringing some of them, with some spouse saying that his wife is trapped in Saudi Arabia or somebody's family is in Pakistan or whatever. They all want to come in. They all have very, kind of, compelling stories.

As I understand it, nobody is guaranteed a visa. And the State Department is struggling with a backlog that they have to, kind of, sort through the best that they can. It strikes me that by saying, You are doing it the wrong way, A, I am not sure that that's my role; B, if it was my role, I am not sure that I would be in a better position than them to know that fiances should go to the bottom of the pool and DV visas should go to the top; and C, given all of that, as I think you are suggesting, there's a lot more people who want DV visas than who get them.

And so the bottom line is, even in a normal year, your client would not be guaranteed a spot. I don't know how your client would get to jump to the top of the line now.

MS. GREENBERG: I can address that. But before, can I address the issue of prioritization and people

having -- suing the government because their spouses or fiance is stuck in another country?

I even want to address the Trump's proclamation 114. He made an exception to certain situation where there was an emergency or -- I don't remember the exact wording but in certain emergency situation people were allowed to apply and get visas and embassies did process those visas.

So my position is that if the government creates this prioritization, it has to be reasonable and it shouldn't be arbitrary and capricious. It has to have a reason why they decided to prioritize family immigration over DV visa applicants, knowing full well -- and I don't even know if they considered the fact that the DV visa applicants had a deadline that was approaching.

If I know that that was part of the equation. And I think this is just the beginning of this lawsuit. If we down the line would find out how the government came to this conclusion, I might concede. But at this point and from other lawsuits that were decided on the merits, it doesn't seem to me that the government was reasonable, and didn't act arbitrary and capricious.

THE COURT: I mean, just as an initial matter, I got to tell you my instinct is that a fiance of a U.S. citizen probably -- it strikes me as very reasonable that we would be prioritizing them over someone like your client who

-- you know, just kind of wants to come and is coming in under the diversity program, but doesn't have one of those familial ties.

MS. GREENBERG: True, Your Honor. But the fiance would ultimately get here. And if we -- if we deem that Congress decides who comes here or not -- well, to whom to give an opportunity to come to this country and the Congress said, We want to people from the low-level of immigration countries to diversify our country. We want educated people. We want people who, you know, somehow deserve to come and have this country strive.

I think it is up to the Congress. If Congress intended to prioritize, let's say fiance over DV visa applicants, we wouldn't be here. My issue here is, there were a lot of things that were done wrong in this case and we are -- we would have probably discovery. Probably we would request the government to provide additional information and then decide.

All I ask this court is to preserve the unused visa for my client. Have we prevail, then she will be able to use it. Otherwise, in six days, the case will become moot, and there will be no line. We are not jumping ahead of line. We are willing to wait as much as it takes, if other people who are now in line will go ahead of us.

But the problem is, I don't see in other cases the

court ruling -- preserving visa numbers for others. So in six days there will be no line. We will be the only people in that line.

THE COURT: Yes, I think you recognize that as a little bit of a too cute of an argument. Right? You have jumped over everybody else who was in line, who is no longer in line at all, by your client being the only person in line for this one golden ticket that everybody else would have loved too.

MS. GREENBERG: True. And if Your Honor is amicable to preserve unused visa numbers for all applicants, that would be even better, because we wouldn't feel that, you know -- I would feel even good if not only my client but other people who got this one-in-a-lifetime chance to come to this country, will get this opportunity, and wait as long as it takes. If it takes one year or two years, we will wait. The problem is, there will be no line. The expiration will come. Nobody else is asking for this relief.

I know that there is a case currently pending before Judge Mehta. He might be ruling on this issue as well. I know that on September 9th he made a ruling that it was premature to reserve visa because we still had a month ahead of us. We are in a different position. We have six days.

THE COURT: So the government argues that I don't have the authority to do that. As you've pointed out, Congress set this deadline; and that it's not the right of the judicial branch to, kind of, nullify something that Congress has set. Why are they wrong?

MS. GREENBERG: I would refer to the ruling, again, by Judge Mehta in *Gomez versus Trump* where he ruled that he does have the authority. Because if he decides the government actions were illegal or, you know, in violation of the law, then he should preserve the status quo. So in *Gomez versus Trump*, the judge did reserve 9,225, I think, visas for 2020 DV applicants. I would just rely on their reasoning in that case.

THE COURT: Do you know -- I saw you cited several cases from Judge Mehta, and the government does not seem to agree with any of them. Is he out on a branch on that or is he relying on Circuit precedent or some other case law?

MS. GREENBERG: Please, Your Honor -- and if this is the only issue before this court, I am willing to brief and submit it the first thing Monday morning. I did read the decision he is relying on. Unfortunately, I don't have it in front of me.

THE COURT: Okay. You said it is Gomez?

MS. GREENBERG: Gomez, yes. There were multiple cases consolidated. There was Gomez I, Gomez II and Gomez

III, but I think it was Gomez I --

THE COURT: Versus Trump?

MS. GREENSBURG: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Anything else, ma'am?

MS. GREENBERG: I just want to touch upon the other factors, the irreparable harm to the movant. I don't think it is disputed here that she will be harmed by not being able to proceed with her DV visa application and it's irreparable. On September 30th, she will forever lose this opportunity to immigrate.

Whether the injunction would injure other interested people, because -- you know, the Department of State have not used the allocated 55,000 visas, so if there will be no line on September 30th, we are not jumping ahead of others. And whether it's a public interest, I think it's in public interest that the executive branch enforces the law as Congress intended it.

THE COURT: On the irreparable harm, I am not sure if the government exactly argues this, but you've got to show that the harm is certain. It strikes me that there's a very good chance your client wouldn't get a diversity visa regardless. Right? There's fewer visas than there are people who want them. So even if the government had been processing visas normally, and they were able to amazingly fill all 55,000 slots, your client still might not have had

one of those. How does that not undermine your certain irreparable harm there?

MS. GREENBERG: So my client visa number is 24,000. And I just want to do quick math. I don't know if the government will use the same math. But in four months it was able -- with the prioritization scheme in place, which I contend that it's in violation of the law and they should have processed more. But in four months they processed 10,439 visas in just four months.

So had they started earlier doing that, given that my client's visa number is 24,000, she would have gotten it. This is my contention. If this court declares that the actions of the government were in violation of the laws, then it's pretty certain that my client would be able at least to have an opportunity — we are not saying, Your Honor, that she is entitled to this visa. What we are saying is she is entitled to an opportunity to have it processed, and then the government can decide if she's eligible or not.

THE COURT: Where is the irreparable harm in that, though? If you are saying that -- you are agreeing you don't have the right to the visa. You are saying you have the right to the visa being processed. An unsuccessful determination doesn't feel like much of a harm. So if that's a realistic possibility, which I think I hear you

suggesting that it is, what's the difference between that and where you are now?

MS. GREENBERG: Well, I looked at my client's qualification. I don't see anything why she would be disqualified. She has high school diploma. In fact, she has a master's degree from the European University. She has no criminal record. She is not sick. So in theory, yes, it's possible. In practical — and I'm an immigration attorney, I would — I can conclude with 99.9 percent certainty that she would get it.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, Ms. Greenberg.

MS. GREENBERG: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Weiland?

MR. WEILAND: Yes. Good afternoon, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Good afternoon.

MR. WEILAND: I think maybe a fine point to begin is with counsel's sort of assertion that it's up to Congress to decide. Looking at this from a very straightforward aspect, the relief she is requesting here is beyond your authority to provide. Congress has spoken clearly that the eligibility period for a diversity visa expires at the end of the fiscal year, September 30th.

We think the Supreme Court has been -- and other cases in this Circuit have been pretty clear -- they are not pointing to any authority, specific authority, of this court

to do so. And it would be entirely predicated upon this court's equitable powers. And those equitable powers cannot be used to set aside a congressional mandate that is quite clear as it is in the INA with regards to the period of eligibility.

So by asking you to reserve a visa from the fiscal year DV-21 -- the fiscal year 21 program over to fiscal year 22 -- you are being asked to rewrite, if you will, or ignore the statute that says it doesn't carry over.

THE COURT: Would Judge Mehta agree with that?

MR. WEILAND: With respect, I don't know that he would, but then again the defendants don't agree with Judge Mehta on that point, because we think it is a clear mandate and that the equitable powers of the court don't go that far.

MR. WEILAND: I'm understanding that he relied on his inherent authority to render an equitable decision in order to remedy what he has perceived as a legal wrong. And it is the defendant's position that as regettable as it is that someone might have their application expire at the end of the fiscal year, that happens every year, and has for a long time. The period of eligibility terminates on September 30th. There is no room within the INA to extend that.

essentially, an equitable power?

The point is that if Congress does want to extend that period of eligibility, the ball is in Congress' court, not this Court's and not the Department of State's.

THE COURT: I'm trying to think. Every once in a while courts are asked to strike down statutes. Isn't that,

MR. WEILAND: No. No one is asking you to strike down the statute here.

THE COURT: Understood. But you are suggesting that the courts can't kind of dance around something that Congress has decided.

MR. WEILAND: I think if this court were to find that particular provision of the INA to be unconstitutional -- which has not been an allegation raised in here, and I don't think it could be -- there might be a path where this court might strike that portion of the statute. But there's not that issue before this court. And it certainly, I don't think, is one that would hold a lot of water as far as this court's ability.

THE COURT: Did the government appeal Judge Mehta in Gomez?

MR. WEILAND: Well, there's not yet a final order in *Gomez*. The judge has, as I understand it, ruled on the motions for summary judgment. He has indicated a sense that he will be reserving a certain number he had reserved in a

preliminary fashion last year, DV-20 visas, and he will be entering some sort of order about an adjudication of those, but that order has not come out. There is no final order yet.

Reading the Gomez opinion and also his opinions in Goh, Goodluck and Filazapovich, which are DV-21 cases, the court has clearly said that there is no right to any particular plaintiff for a diversity visa. And it's, I think, reasonably expected that Judge Mehta will enter an order that says a certain number need to be processed, but not that anyone in particular is going to receive the benefit of that.

Which goes to, I think, plaintiff's irreparable harm argument, here, which is that this court should reserve specifically a visa for her. And that, I assert, is based — or the defendants assert is based on a false premise that being selected in the diversity lottery entitles one to a visa. It only entitles them to the opportunity to apply. And there are many wickets that have to be hit, if you will, before the visa can issue. And many, many lottery winners, folks who have signed up online and received the opportunity, don't get visas, even in years where we are not contending with a pandemic.

I think this was -- we provided a notice of supplemental authority yesterday, Your Honor. I think

Judge Kollar-Kotelly hit that point pretty clearly in her ruling on a set of facts and circumstances that are very similar to the facts and circumstances you have here.

THE COURT: All right. So I guess that's your first point, that you don't think I even have the authority to do this.

MR. WEILAND: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: But even if I did, you're suggesting -- and I think Ms. Greenberg has conceded this -- that there's no right -- you know, that this 55,000 number is a ceiling, not a floor. So if you don't adjudicate all of those, there's no problem.

MR. WEILAND: Yes, Your Honor.

Even in a year when there is no pandemic, there are other matters that sometimes preclude the Department of State from issuing every single possible diversity visa available under the statute. I think it's 1153(a) that says it shall not exceed 55,000 or the number in 1153(e), which is the 55,000 target.

Every year some are left on the table that don't get adjudicated. And that's because the State Department's — the guidance from Congress — and we would submit the objective here is to adjudicate as many as they can, take into consideration everything that is going on.

And the last two years, I don't think anybody in

this courtroom would wish that we have had to go through everything that has transpired over the last two years with regards to the pandemic. But it is real. It has had lasting consequences on both operations at KCC, as you see in the declarations, and also in the consulates overseas.

I would also submit that compounding the issue, with regards to this particular plaintiff, is this case is one that is assigned to the embassy in Moscow. There have been other factors beyond the control of the defendants with regards to the capacity of that particular consulate to operate as normal. The Russian government has taken a series of measures against the U.S. mission in the Russian federation that has severely curtailed their ability to meet the obligations of the State Department.

And it's a matter of, I would submit, extreme sensitivity that I think this court expressed some reticence of wading into the middle of decisions made by a chief of mission as to what is the best course of conduct with regards to ensuring he can operate and meet his or her mission safely and in the confines of the diplomatic relations of the United States.

THE COURT: So Ms. Greenberg has focused on the Kentucky service center, but it sounds like you don't think that's really where the pinch is.

MR. WEILAND: No, Your Honor. If you look at the

Miles' declaration, before the proclamation was rescinded — and I want to address that a little bit further — but before it was resigned, KCC was already pushing out, in February of this year, already pushing out information to the consulates for slotting into appointments, with the view that it was going to expire. President Biden took action to terminate it ahead of its expiration date, but they were already working that as early as February.

The clear context of that is they can't push out applications in February, if they hadn't started working them beforehand. It's not an instantaneous thing. KCC wasn't sitting on its hands. It was — consulates were scheduling with limited resources, scheduling those resources based on the priorities that they had in front of them.

The obligation to deal with not just the global backlog, which we think the declaration show exploded to almost 500,000 cases, but also the local backlog. When these consulates have to shut down, terminate appointments, send people home, there were folks who had interview slots who are now having to be rescheduled locally as well. It's not just the global backlog, but it's a compounding problem. You had an appointment in March. You're not going to be able to come in March? You have to come in April. You cannot come in April? You're going to have to come in May.

1 THE COURT: Remind me, which comes first, Kentucky 2 or the consulate? 3 MR. WEILAND: Kentucky. THE COURT: So is she through Kentucky? 4 5 MR. WEILAND: No. 6 THE COURT: Why does it matter what is happening 7 at the Russian consulate? MR. WEILAND: The reason she is not through, 8 9 Kentucky is the end of the pipeline and the Russian consulate is small. I think the number was -- they shut 10 11 down three of the four consulates. So there is only the one 12 left in Moscow. They are operating at around 20 percent of 13 capacity, I believe is the number. Don't quote me on this, 14 Your Honor. It is more clearly stated in the declaration. 15 So you can only push so many cases through the 16 pipeline to come out that end. In the declaration you will 17 see there are at least 596 other people who are ready, 18 documentarily qualified, ahead of her for the remaining 19 interview slots in this fiscal year. 20 THE COURT: They'd have to be interviewed by the 21 end of this month? 22 MR. WEILAND: I can -- if you give me a moment, 23 Your Honor. 24 THE COURT: Sure. 25 MR. WEILAND: Your Honor, I am referring now to

Exhibit A of the defendant's submission, page --

THE COURT: This is the Miles' declaration?

MR. WEILAND: Yes, sir. Paragraph 17, Page 6 of that declaration, ECF Page No. 7. So as of September 21st, there are at least 596 cases representing 1375 diversity visa applicants ahead of her in the queue for Moscow? So, yes, they also have the impending deadline. She is behind them.

THE COURT: So you are saying that even if she was kind of cycled through Kentucky today, there's no way she would, absent some sort of extraordinary court order, be interviewed and get a visa by the end of this month.

MR. WEILAND: Right, Your Honor. I don't know where she is in the queue. There is also a bunch at KCC, but based on this information from Mr. Miles, there are at least 596 other cases, 1375 other applicants, ahead of her. So to get her in you would have to move her ahead of all of those folks, who have been waiting their turn.

THE COURT: So as I understand it, though, if you are not going to use all 55,000 spots this year because you're just not going to get to them, is she really jumping the line though if we're kind of taking a -- one of those 55,000 spots, that is not actually going to be used anyway, and holding it for her?

MR. WEILAND: Yes, sir, because at least 596 cases

are in front of her. Right? They would also have the same or superior claim to one of those slots. So she would be jumping in line.

Even by preserving it past the September 30th deadline, which defendants don't believe this court can do, you would be moving her interests ahead of all of these folks who are similarly situated.

THE COURT: Can you respond to Ms. Greenberg's arguments about the potentially arbitrary and capricious way that State has prioritized other types of visas over DV visas?

MR. WEILAND: Yes, Your Honor.

First, I would submit that's not in her complaint. There's no 7062 claim here that the policy is arbitrary and capricious. So we don't think she can rely on that for the purposes of this motion. She hasn't brought that claim.

I believe Your Honor is asking about the November 2020 prioritization scheme.

THE COURT: Yes. She is saying that, you know, the DV visas were pushed to the bottom. They are the only ones with this expiration date.

MR. WEILAND: Sure.

THE COURT: That kind of or perhaps suggests

Congressional prioritization that the executive branch has ignored.

MR. WEILAND: Responding to that directly, Your

Honor -- and I do want to touch on the no-visa policy

assertion she made about the presidential proclamation,

which, just real quickly, was over in February. She

wouldn't have standing to complain about that. She filed

her lawsuit in this case in July. There is nothing for this

court to enjoin. The proclamation has been recinded. And

the term, "no-visa policy", which is relatively opaque in

her pleading, is a direct reference to Judge Mehta's term, a

term he coined, which specifically means the State

Department's legal position in policy that proclamation

10014's, restriction on entry by operational law, rendered

diversity visa selectees ineligible to receive a diversity

visa.

Your Honor is not being asked in this complaint to render an assessment of that no-visa policy to the extent that that phrase is out there. There's never been a State Department policy memo on this front that says no-visa policy.

With regards to the question about the prioritization scheme, I think this goes to TRAC factors 1 and 2, which we raised with regards to her failure to state a claim, which is the rule of reason. You will find in enclosure 1 -- enclosure B-1 of Mr. Lanning's declaration, the policy memorandum that lays out the specific thought

process of the State Department, it is a reasoned consideration based on their interpretation of the different priorities Congress has expressed in the INA. The INA's focus from the start, and for a long period of time, since the beginning, since the fifties, has been on family unification.

So it's not unreasonable, it's not irrational for the State Department to look at that and say, Given an environment in which we have limited resources available to adjudicate visas, given our focus on citizen services — first, that's an expectation of our citizenship or citizenry — we will focus as much effort as we possibly can on bringing families together. U.S. citizens, spouses, their children, their minor children, is in the top category.

You will also see in that memorandum -- and it's exhibit 1 -- you will see that they prioritize special immigrants, those who have rendered a service to our country that merit some significant consideration. The most recent news on that is our Afgahn friends and allies who have sacrificed quite a bit to support us. And the State Department is focused on providing them. Fiances of American citizens is a priority.

When you look at -- I guess my point is, it is all based on a rule of reason. The State Department in their

understanding has gone and taken a hard look at the INA and said, This is how we need to work through these cases.

Now, the State Department is -- and I will note,
Judge Mehta did issue a preliminary injunction in Goodluck
where he said the prioritization scheme cannot be applied to
diversity visa applicants, removing them from the November
2020 guidance. And defendants are complying with that
ruling. They have sent instructions to the field that the
field is to make their best efforts to process diversity
visas before the end of the year.

Judge Mehta was also clear he is not asking them to drop everything and do only diversity visas. He's not asking them to cancel appointments for spouses or minor children of U.S. citizens. He has just ruled that the prioritization plan cannot be used as a basis of denying them a slot.

The State Department has made their best efforts and has moved -- I think you will see in the numbers, the tables there, they are moving as much as they can. It's a bit of a math problem, if you will, Your Honor. There are only so many days left in the fiscal year and only so many people who can do the job.

THE COURT: Sure. Anything else, Mr. Weiland?

MR. WEILAND: If I could just have a moment, Your

Honor.

28 1 Barring any further questions from the Court, Your 2 Honor, I am happy to rely on our briefing. 3 THE COURT: Thank you. 4 MR. WEILAND: Thank you, sir. 5 THE COURT: Ms. Greenberg, I will give you the last word. 6 7 Thank you, Your Honor. MS. GREENBERG: 8 Your Honor, on the issue of whether in our initial 9 petition we have requested this Court to review whether the 10 agency actions were arbitrary and capricious. I would refer 11 to column 2 of our petition where we brought this suit under 12 the violation -- we allege that the defendant violated the 13 Administrative Procedure Act, which provided court shall 14 compel agency action unwilfully witheld or unreasonably 15 delayed. 16 On the issue of the embassy in Moscow -- first of 17 all, the Kentucky Consular Center has the ability to 18 transfer cases, particularly DV cases from one consular post 19 to another. And, in fact, on June 25th, I sent an email to 20

the Kentucky consular service advising them that petitioner wanted to proceed with her case in Warsaw.

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In Miles' declaration, Warsaw does process cases, and it has much less backlog than Moscow. From the top of my head I think it has currently over a thousand cases pending and already one-third of that being scheduled for an interview.

Even if we have not emailed the Kentucky Consular Center, Ms. Miles also acknowledges that when they see that the embassy has no available slots or unable to process visa application, they can, by themselves, send cases to another consulate post. I don't understand why no cases from Moscow were transferred considering that in the chart that Ms. Miles provided there is zero interviews scheduled as of now in the U.S. embassy in Moscow.

And lastly, Your Honor, if the issue comes to whether you have authority to reserve unused visas, I would ask to provide this Court with supplemental brief as early as 9:00 on Monday, and give you a table of authorities as to why we think you do have that authority to reserve unused DV visas past September 30th deadline.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, ma'am.

Let's take a break. I will be back with you all shortly.

(Break.)

THE COURT: All right. Before the Court is plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction and temporary retraining order. Ms. Serakova has filed a complaint in this court challenging the government's failure to act on her application for a diversity visa. Under the applicable statutes and regulations, she will no longer be

eligible for that type of visa after September 30th, 2021, which marks the end of the fiscal year.

To avoid her case becoming moot on that date,

Serakova asked this Court for a temporary restraining order

and preliminary injunction to direct the government to

reserve a diversity visa for her. That visa would be

reserved past the fiscal-year deadline on September 30th.

This kind of preliminary relief is an extraordinary and drastic remedy that the court issues only upon a clear showing by the moving party; that's from Winter versus Natural Resources Defense Counsel, 555 U.S. 7, Page 22 from 2008.

As an initial matter, I find that Serakova has not made a clear showing as to whether the Court has any authority to reserve diversity visas past September 30th.

Under federal statutory law, someone selected in the lottery for a diversity visa remains eligible for that visa, "only through the end of the specific fiscal year for which she was selected". That is from 8 U.S.C. 1154(a)(1)(I)(ii).

That eligibility runs out once the fiscal year ends.

Even sitting in equity this court, "cannot ignore the judgment of Congress as deliberately expressed in legislation." That's from *United States versus Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Co-op*, 532 U.S. 483, Page 497 from 1983.

That is especially true in the area of immigration in which courts are without authority to sanction changes or modifications to the terms and conditions specified by Congress; that's from INS versus Pangilinan, 486 U.S. 875, Pages 883 to 884 from 1998. Yet Serakova asked the court to do just that. She applied for a visa in fiscal year 2021 and accordingly remains eligible only for that fiscal year. The Court would flout statutory guidelines if it reserved a visa for her into the following year. This Court cannot take such an action contrary to the clear text of the statute.

In oral argument just now, we've been discussing a Gomez case from another judge of this district. I think there was perhaps some confusion over the citation, but I think the case that plaintiffs were referring to was 490 F.Supp.3d 276, from 2020, Gomez versus Trump.

Another judge did reserve diversity -- some sort of visas -- I think it was diversity visas past the statutory deadline in reliance on Almaqrami versus Pompeo, 933 F.3d. 774, where the D.C. Circuit, in 2019, rejected an argument from the government that a case was moot because a fiscal year deadline had passed, finding that it was not implausible that the District Court here could rely on equity to take steps to compel the issuance of diversity visas notwithstanding the end of FY-2017. That is from Page

781 of the D.C. Circuit case.

As I read that D.C. Circuit case, the D.C. Circuit suggests that Ms. Serakova may be right, that there may be authority to do this type of thing. I certainly don't think the D.C. Circuit held that. It merely found that a decision from the District Court was not moot and remanded to the District Court to do further consideration there.

My inclination is that I don't have the authority to do this for the reasons I stated, but I know the plaintiffs have sought to do additional briefing on this. Obviously, this is a very short time frame, and I think this is something of a close call on that question. So rather than have the plaintiff do further briefing, I am going to go on and even assuming that the plaintiff was right that I do have the authority to grant this type of relief, I would not grant the relief for these additional reasons.

First, Congress allows for approximately 55,000 diversity visas per fiscal year. As both parties agree, that number is a ceiling, not a floor. Indeed, the State Department has awarded fewer visas than that in recent years. I'm looking to the government's opposition at Page 3. And as the government notes, the State Department's own website for the diversity visa expressly says that applicants are not guaranteed a visa simply if they are picked in the lottery. That is from Page 4 of the

government's opposition.

Serakova was picked in the lottery, but that makes her merely eligible. She must then submit documents and be scheduled for a consular interview. Nothing requires that all of those steps must occur before September 30th, and indeed, it doesn't for many people. As I said, that 55,000 number is just a cap.

I therefore find that Serakova has not made a clear showing that she has a right to a diversity visa at all, much less to have such a visa reserved for her beyond September 30th.

And even if the Court is wrong about its authority and about her entitlement to having a diversity visa reserved for it, I still believe that the contents of her complaint would not justify the extraordinary relief of a TRO or a preliminary injunction under the Winter factors.

To do that, she must show a likelihood of success in the merits of her claim. Second, that she will likely suffer irreparable injury in the absence of the TRO. Third, that the balance of equity tips in her favor. And fourth, that the proposed order advances the public's interest. Those last two factors merge when the government is the defendant.

For her APA claim, Serakova has not clearly shown a likelihood of success on the merits. I reach this

conclusion based in large part on my analysis in a very similar case, *Dastagir versus Blinken*, 2021 West Law 2894645, from earlier this year. There the plaintiff, like Serakova, objected to the delayed processing time for a visa application submitted to the U.S. embassy in Moscow.

This Court reviewed the six TRAC factors and found that the 29-month delay was reasonable in light of COVID-19 and the Russian government's restrictions that Russian nationals could not work in the U.S. embassy. I think a very similar analysis would apply here, and I incorporate the analysis from that case by reference.

Serakova has dealt with a much shorter delay on her visa, and the circumstances on the ground in Russia have continued, providing ample justification for that delay. The government cannot control pandemics, nor can they control restrictions imposed by third-party governments.

Serakova asserts in her reply that the lack of staffing in Moscow has nothing to do with the delay in processing her visa. She instead lays blame at the Kentucky Consular Center. But as I understand it, to obtain a visa, she must have an interview at the embassy. Thus, even if the consular center had forwarded her materials, the conditions at Moscow might help explain any delay in processing her visa, thus the lack of staffing there, to say nothing of COVID restrictions, remains relevant.

Mere at oral argument, counsel for Serakova also mentioned the Warsaw office. But, again, I think the same general issue applies where there are hundreds of people who are seeking these interviews in the last few days of the fiscal year. And I find that the plaintiff has not shown why the Court can or should insert itself and order the center to handle her request before any other. Such an order interferes with the agency's unique position to allocate its own resources in an optimal way.

More, Ms. Serakova asked to be placed at the front of the line for diversity visa, ahead of many others waiting for one. As recognized by several courts in this district, the agency is best situated to deal with immigration backlogs and to adjust resources accordingly. I am looking, for instance, in addition to Dastagir, to Tate versus Pompeo, from this district earlier this year.

I know Ms. Greenberg argues she's not really asking for her client to be put to the front of the line, but rather that she would be the only one left in the line. Frankly, I think however we describe it, she's asking for her client to receive special treatment that other people who are ahead of her, who sent their materials in ahead of her, who have gone through the consular center ahead of her, who have equally compelling reasons for wanting to come to the United States, why she is leap frogging them, and they

are going to be left without visas.

More, if I am ordering the government to give her special treatment, it's hard to see how that wouldn't disadvantage someone else who the government would be interviewing instead, whose paperwork they would be processing instead. I don't think it is appropriate for me to micromanage that process.

And although this Court sympathizes with Serakova's predicament, she is not alone. The Court cannot override how the agency has chosen to triage so many competing applicants for a diversity visa. Also, here in oral arguments, we discussed whether there was something arbitrary and capricious about the way that the government has prioritized some of these family-related visas over the diversity-related visas.

I am not sure that's really before me, but in any event, I don't think under the preliminary injunction standards, the plaintiff has shown that there's anything arbitrary or capricious with the government prioritizing family separation cases over cases like the defendant, who is primarily just seeking to come to the United States for the first time and with no similar familial ties to the country.

The same analysis would pertain for the mandamus claim. She must show she has a clear right to the relief

she seeks. As the Court has already noted, she has not clearly shown her right to a diversity visa in fiscal year 2021, despite being picked in the visa lottery. Nor has she shown, for the reasons already stated, that she has a clear right to the reservation of visas beyond the statutory deadline of September 30th.

Thus, I find in both of her claims, Serakova has not shown a clearly likelihood of success in the merits, and she therefore has not met the first Winter factor. That alone would justify, again, denying the preliminary injunction. But I also find that she has not clearly shown irreparable injury here. As I said, the Court sympathizes with her difficulties, but she is in the same boat as a lot of other people.

As I said, and as Ms. Greenberg admits, she's not claiming that she's entitled to a visa. She's claiming that she's entitled to a visa adjudication. It's not clear to me how failing to get a visa adjudication is a certain irreparable injury here. For all of those reasons I find that irreparable harm has not been shown.

Finally, the third and fourth Winter factors combined, because the government is the non-moving party, Serakova has not clearly shown that the equities tip in her favor or that a TRO is in the public interest

As I mentioned earlier, her motion would vault her

to the head of the line for a visa; that maneuver would incur further delays for other applicants. The State

Department would also be unable to direct its resources as it sees fit. Eliminating agency resources in this way is particularly problematic when faced with COVID and restrictions from local governments. For all these reasons, the Court denies the motion for a preliminary injunction and for a TRO.

All right. Ms. Greenberg, I think at this point we just proceed with the complaint; is that your understanding, ma'am?

MS. GREENBERG: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. I think the government -- well, the government has still not yet been properly served. I'll just note, ma'am, federal rule of civil procedure 4.1 requires that a plaintiff must deliver the summons and complaint to the United States attorney. I've seen -- the only information I've seen from you is that you've mailed your materials to the U.S. Attorney's Office. I don't think that is sufficient process under the federal rules.

Federal rule of civil procedure 4 also requires a plaintiff to send by registered or certified mail the complaint to the attorney general of the United States. It looks to me that you sent them by first class mail, but I'll ask you, just to make sure, that you are doing proper

service on the United States. And I'll look for the
government's response in due course.
Ms. Greenberg, anything further for plaintiff?
MS. GREENBERG: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And Mr. Weiland?
MR. WEILAND: Nothing further, Your Honor. Your
last explanation about service cleared up our question.
THE COURT: Okay. Thanks, folks. Have a good
weekend.
MS. GREENBERG: You too. Thank you.
(Proceedings concluded at 3:56 p.m.)

CERTIFICATE

I, Lorraine T. Herman, Official Court

Lorraine T. Herman

Reporter, certify that the foregoing is a true and correct transcript of the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

DATE